To avoid identity theft or impersonation in biometric authentication schemes, fingerprint data is typically stored locally, e.g., in a trusted hardware module, in a single device that is used for user enrollment and authentication. Local storage, however, limits the ability to implement distributed applications, in which users can enroll their fingerprint once and use it to access multiple resources afterwards. In this paper, we present a distributed authentication system that stores fingerprint data in a server or cloud infrastructure in a privacy-preserving way. Multiple devices can be connected and perform user enrollment or verification. To secure the privacy and integrity of sensitive data, we employ a cryptographic construct called fuzzy vault. As a proof of concept, we build an authentication system for access control using resource-constrained devices (Raspberry Pis) connected to fingerprint scanners and the Microsoft Azure cloud environment. Furthermore, we evaluate the fingerprint matching algorithm against the well-known FVC2006 database and show that it can achieve comparable accuracy to widely-used matching techniques that are not designed for privacy, while remaining efficient with an authentication time of a few seconds.
INTRODUCTION
Biometric authentication with fingerprints offers the benefit of high reliability, since biometrics cannot be lost or forgotten, and biometric forgery or theft is very difficult. Due to the sensitivity of biometric data, it is commonly stored in a secure local storage to protect it from leaking to external attackers. However, this also prevents the development of (efficient) distributed biometric authentication. A distributed authentication system eliminates the need to enroll fingerprints at each site separately, by using a one-time sign up instead and enabling access to multiple locations afterwards. Despite its usability and convenience, distributed authentication is still not widely accepted due to the high risk of biometrics being stolen when stored online in untrusted environments [12] .
Our work aims at developing a distributed fingerprintbased authentication system that protects the users' sensitive data, highlighting implementation challenges and proposing solutions. We base our authentication system on the well established fuzzy vault [6] that provides strong security [6] and accuracy [11] , and present its first deployment in a real-world distributed setting. The results of this work are extensively presented in [5] . Figure 1 depicts our distributed fingerprint authentication system model, which features an arbitrary number of local computers equipped with fingerprint sensors (FPS) that are connected to the Internet over remote servers in the cloud.
SYSTEM AND THREAT MODEL 2.1 System Model
An image of the fingerpint is captured by a local FPS (1) and processed at the connected local computer to enable feature extraction (2) . The resulting template is converted to a secure data structure, a fuzzy vault, that is stored in a database (3) in the cloud and can be accessed by other local computers for user verification (4) . This operation can be executed multiple times and enrolling and verifying a fingerprint can be conducted at any local computer.
Threat Model
In our work, we focus on the protection and privacy of the biometrics of genuine users. The attacker either has the intention of extracting valuable assets or wants to gain unauthorized access by fooling the biometric system. We consider that the attacker is successful if she can determine the genuine minutiae in a fuzzy vault, which allows identity theft, or if she Figure 1 : System and threat model.
can successfully authenticate against a fuzzy vault without the appropriate biometrics, permits her to gain unauthorized access and perform identity theft as well.
The trusted and non-trusted parts are depicted in Figure 1 in green and red, respectively. We assume that the FPS is directly connected to a trusted processor and our application is running in a secure execution environment. Neither the components outside the processor on the local computer, nor the connections to the server and the server itself are trusted. Please refer to our full paper [5] for more details.
BIOMETRIC CRYPTOSYSTEM
To implement our distributed biometric cryptosystem, we develop a fingerprint authentication algorithm which uses the secure construct fuzzy vault for protecting sensitive data.
The principle of fuzzy vault was first introduced by Juels et al. [6] and is a cryptographic construction which "locks" a secret key using a set of elements . The secret key can then only be "unlocked" by a set of elements which is sufficiently similar to set . An in-depth justification of why and how the fuzzy vault concept has been adopted for minutiae-based fingerprint authentication is given in [5] . We build and improve upon the work of Uludag et al. [17] and Nandakumar et al. [11] , especially w.r.t. fingerprint alignment and security. Implementation challenges and alternative solutions are further discussed in [5] .
Vault Encoding
1) Fingerprint Gallery Image. The fingerprint image of the user is given as input to the enrollment algorithm.
2) Minutiae Extraction. The minutiae are extracted from the given fingerprint image. These are points that are defined as ridge endings or ridge bifurcations and they have three attributes ( , , ). We call the extracted minutiae from a real fingerprint image genuine minutiae. 3) Minutiae Selection. As the amount of points in the fuzzy vault is assumed to be constant, only the minutiae that have the best quality in terms of contrast, flow curves and curvature [7] are used. 4) Chaff minutiae Generation. In order to obscure the genuine minutiae from a possible attacker, we randomly generate 10 times as many chaff minutiae as there are genuine minutiae, which yields a reasonable balance between complexity of a brute force attack and performance [11] . 5) Minutiae Encoding. To create tuples and polynomial mappings for the fuzzy vault, we encode the three attributes of each minutia as a bit string of size 32 (11 bits for each , coordinate, 10 bits for ). We choose this configuration to accommodate typical fingerprint image sizes and allow easy conversion to an unsigned integer to represent a minutia. 6) Secret Generation. The secret bit length needs to be divisible by 8 to allow smooth conversion to bytes. Additionally, the length of the secret plus the length of its CRC encoding needs to be divisible by + 1, where is the polynomial degree, so that the secret can be split equally to polynomial coefficients. In our implementation, we generate a random integer with a bit length that satisfies both mentioned constraints. 7) CRC Coding. We choose a 32-bit CRC over a 16-bit CRC which was used in [11, 17] to achieve lower collision probability and hence better reliability. 8) Polynomial Encoding. The secret and its CRC coding are both converted to a bit string and the CRC coding is then appended to the generated secret. Afterwards, the whole bit string is split into + 1 parts interpreted as unsigned integers to get the specific coefficients needed for Polynomial Projection. 9) Polynomial Projection. The structure of the fuzzy vault is a set of ( , ) tuples, where contains a genuine or chaff minutia. Every genuine minutia representation is mapped on the secret polynomial and the resulting value is saved as the second element of the tuple = ( ). The polynomial mapping is conducted in a Galois field so that exact polynomial interpolation in vault decoding is possible. A chaff minutia is randomly mapped to a number in the possible result space of the polynomial projection, so that it does not lie on the polynomial with ( ). This mapping yields the second element of the tuple. 10) Vault Scrambling. The fuzzy vault is finalized by shuffling all vault tuples so that the tuples with genuine minutiae cannot be distinguished from the ones containing chaff minutiae. This problem affects the matching of probe minutiae with genuine minutiae in the vault, and to address it, we use the approach of geometric hashing [18] . As a global alignment scheme geometric hashing achieves higher matching accuracy than local schemes [3] and it does not need any public helper data like orientation field-based [16] , which can leak information about the genuine minutiae. When aligning the probe minutiae with the vault ones, the first element of a vault tuple is taken as basis and all other vault minutiae are transformed according to this basis. We discovered that by using a 10-degree difference limit between potential bases and minutiae received from the probe template, we can reduce the total runtime by more than two thirds. A thorough explanation is given in [5] along with a description of our implementation of geometric hashing.
Vault Decoding
To match two minutiae, we use three primary thresholds, i.e., for ( , , ). If the differences in the attributes of two minutiae satisfy all thresholds, the two minutiae are considered to be a match and we place the corresponding vault tuple into a candidate set. The threshold values must be chosen carefully as large thresholds lead to higher risk of false matches and low thresholds lead to conservative matching with a considerable accuracy drop of our algorithm. This trade-off is further discussed in [5] along with different strategies for candidate subsets generation. 6) Polynomial Interpolation. Polynomial interpolation is initiated if the size of the candidate set is larger than + 1 at the end of one run with two given bases. If fewer candidates are found, the secret polynomial cannot be interpolated. In case of sufficient vault tuples in the candidate set, all subsets of size + 1 need to be evaluated as not all candidate tuples contain genuine gallery minutiae. For each subset, Lagrange interpolation is conducted in a Galois field (2 32 ) using +1 vault tuples, which are interpreted as ( , ) data points with and being the vault tuple elements. The resulting interpolated polynomial is passed to the next step. If the CRC error detection reports an error, the algorithm continues to interpolate other subsets of the candidate set and eventually proceeds to match vault minutiae with other bases if no subset has given a match. 7) CRC Error Detection. If the CRC integrity check is correct, our algorithm reports the successful unlocking of the vault and therefore a match.
DISTRIBUTED ACCESS CONTROL
Our distributed access control application serves as a proof of concept for the applicability of fingerprint-based authentication with fuzzy vault using commercial fingerprint sensors and a cloud environment in a real-world setting. The link to the source code can be found in [5] . Setup and Services. For the implementation of our distributed system we use Adafruit Fingerprint Sensors [1] to capture fingerprints, Raspberry Pis [13] as local computers, the library Pyfingerprint [2] to connect Adafruit fingerprint sensors with Raspberry Pis, Azure Cosmos DB [9] as storage in the cloud and PyMongo [10] to access Azure Cosmos DB. Please refer to [5] for more details. The data flow between the hardware, libraries and services is illustrated through arrows in Figure 2 .
To enroll a fingerprint, the user is prompted for an ID number, which is later used to verify the fingerprint. Then, the user can enroll a fingerprint by placing a finger on the Adafruit fingerprint sensor. The image is downloaded to the connected Raspberry Pi and the minutiae are extracted. The user is prompted to rescan the finger if too few minutiae were found. If a suitable fingerprint image with enough minutiae is captured, a fuzzy vault is created according to vault encoding. The previously defined ID number is attached to the fuzzy vault and the whole structure is serialized to a JSON object using Python dictionaries and sent to Azure Cosmos DB with PyMongo. The JSON object contains an internal object ID, the ID number provided by the user and an array of ( , ) vault tuples. After the database confirms the reception of the vault, the local vault as well as the fingerprint image and template are deleted.
To verify a fingerprint, the user is prompted for an ID number first, so that the corresponding fuzzy vault can be retrieved from the database. The fuzzy vault in JSON format is fetched from Cosmos DB and deserialized for vault decoding. The user is asked to place his finger on the Adafruit fingerprint sensor, so that a probe fingerprint with sufficient minutiae can be captured.
After a suitable fingerprint image is scanned, vault decoding is run with the fuzzy vault. If the vault is successfully decoded, a match is reported. Otherwise, the system reports an authentication failure. The probe fingerprint template and the corresponding image are deleted from the local computer.
EVALUATION
We evaluate our fuzzy vault algorithm using a public fingerprint database and compare it to widely-used algorithms for fingerprint recognition in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2 we discuss the impact of parameter choices on security and usability, and in Section 5.3 we present results specific to the distributed access control application. For further information concerning the experimental setup and the security analysis, please refer to the full paper [5] .
Evaluation of Authentication Algorithm
For our experiments we consider various different parameters with polynomial degree and #genuine minutiae being the most relevant concerning accuracy and runtime performance. The results of the experiments of the authentication algorithm can be found in Table 1 . Please refer to the full paper [5] for more details about the experiment configurations and the parameter choices. Our algorithm can be tuned to achieve very different FMR/FNMR ratios as can be seen in Table 1 . For security, we aim to minimize the FMR (False Match Rate). For usability, we aim to minimize the FNMR (False Non-Match Rate) as well as the time needed for a successful authentication. It always depends on the use case to decide on the desired trade-off between security and usability. For instance, configuration 3 has the lowest FNMR in all of our experiments with roughly 3%, however, it would be unacceptable security-wise in most use cases with a 4.22% FMR. Configuration 4 has the highest FNMR with no single false positive (FMR=0), which makes it suitable for a high-security application, where users are willing to accept some compromise in usability. We presume that configurations 1 and 5 achieve a reasonable balance for most practical applications. With these two configurations we achieve an FNMR that is close to the one we get with NBIS BOZORTH3, the fingerprint matching algorithm of NBIS [7] , which is a common reference in literature. The respective authentication runtime is acceptable (< 2.4 sec).
Furthermore, we compare our algorithm to P-MCC 64 by Ferrara et al. [4] . Their implementation achieves less than 1% FNMR with 0% FMR against FVC2006 2A. For FMR ≤ 0.1%, P-MCC 64 can achieve an FNMR of less than 0.5%. However, the chance that a randomly selected minutia in a reversed template is real is almost 25% with P-MCC 64 [4] . We show that our algorithm achieves a 30 to 46-bit security level and thus provides higher security guarantees. Please, refer to the security analysis in [5] for further details.
We also compare our algorithm to a fuzzy extractor prototype based on the findings by Sutcu et al. [14] , which is based around feature vector extraction to obtain minutiae information that is difficult to invert using cuboids. We implemented and ran a basic implementation of the fuzzy extractor against the FVC2006 2A database with an FMR of 7.16%, an FNMR of 80.63% and an average total runtime of roughly 7 seconds. Compared to this simple prototype, our algorithm achieves a significantly higher accuracy with a lower runtime.
A direct comparison to previous fuzzy vault implementations [8, 11, 15, 17] was not feasible as their algorithms are evaluated against non publicly available fingerprint databases or older FVC databases. Our results on FVC2006 indicate equal or higher accuracy compared to their reported results. Recall that security is also expected to be better as our approach does not depend on public helper data for fingerprint alignment. fixing all parameters but the one whose impact we analyze with polynomial degree and #genuine minutiae affecting FMR and FNMR the most. With the configuration of polynomial degree = 12 we roughly achieve a 46-bit security level. Further details about the analysis of parameter impact and the security analysis can be found in the full paper [5] .
Evaluation of Parameter Impact

Evaluation of Distributed Application
To test our algorithm in the distributed setting, we conduct experiments for both enrolling and verifying a fingerprint. Experimental setting and detailed results can be found in [5] . Our experiments show that the FPS capture runtime, i.e., the time the application needs to download the fingerprint image and run MINDTCT from NBIS [7] , represents the largest part of the overall runtime, which is at least over 55%. Given that the minutiae detection with MINDTCT is very fast on average, we conclude that the FPS capture runtime is constrained by the hardware of the Adafruit FPS which does not allow faster transmission to the Raspberry Pi. Due to the limited resources of Raspberry Pi, our algorithm runs with an average of approximately 20 sec.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we designed and built a proof-of-concept biometric cryptosystem based on fuzzy vault that can be used for distributed authentication with strong security and privacy guarantees. We presented real-world implementation challenges and proposed solutions. The experimental results and the prototype implementation with commercial hardware show that an application of this cryptosystem is feasible in practice, as it is more secure than widely-used fingerprint recognition algorithms without compromising accuracy or runtime performance. At the same time, it improves upon existing cryptosystems in terms of security due to the independence from helper data for fingerprint alignment. Hence, we consider it a realistic solution for secure and usable distributed authentication.
In future work, we intend to evaluate our access control application on various hardware platforms and use cases, as well as customize it to their requirements to evaluate its performance in industrial settings.
